GCI TECH
NOTES©
Volume
5, Number
07
A Gossman
Consulting, Inc.
Publication
July, 1999
Risk Assessments and Process
Upsets
David
Constans
To obtain a permit for
a hazardous waste
combustion
unit, a Human Health Risk Assessment must be performed and submitted as
part of the permit application. This assessment is usually based on
stack
emissions data obtained during the trial burn and prevailing weather
conditions
in the locality.
USEPA Region 6 has
prepared a Human
Health Risk Assessment
Protocol (July, 1998). This protocol provides guidance on conducting
this
risk assessment. One of the items included in Chapter 2: Facility
Characterization
is a discussion on why and how process upsets should be considered when
determining emission rates used for performing this assessment. This
Tech
Notes addresses this guidance as it applies to cement kilns operating
under
the BIF regulations.
In Section 2.2.1 it is
stated, (EPA)
"...expects
that emission rates used to complete the risk assessment will be (1)
long-term
average emission rates adjusted for upsets, or (2) reasonable maximum
emission
rates measured during trial burn conditions in order to assure that
risk
assessments are conservative." EPA's concern is that a process upset
would
result in short periods of greater than normal stack emissions.
Section 2.2.5
discusses the origin of
these process
upsets describing them in general terms and relating specific examples.
The document lists "start-ups", "shut-downs", "malfunctions of the
combustion
units or APCDs" or upsets in other units which cascade to the hazardous
waste combustion device resulting in an upset. In more general terms,
these
process upsets are described as being the result of "when the hazardous
waste combustion unit is not being operated as intended...."
"...usually
during events and times when the hazardous waste combustion unit is not
operating within the limits specified in a permit or regulation." EPA's
concern is that the selected operating parameters cannot be reliably
maintained
and that exceedences of these parameters would result in increased
emissions.
Cement Kilns Operating Under the BIF
Regulations
and Process Upsets
In cement kilns
operating under the BIF
regulations,
a "start-up" process upset is precluded from occurring. The kiln system
must be operating within specified parameters and monitored emission
requirements
before
hazardous waste fuel may be utilized.
Upsets caused by
shut-downs or
malfunctions are of
two types.
- The most common type is the
controlled discontinuation
of the use of hazardous waste fuel only. This type of shut-down may
occur
due to a variety of reasons from purposeful to the result of an AWFCO.
In these instances, the kiln system continues to operate utilizing the
primary fossil fuel. Critical operating parameters remain well within
the
specified ranges and the APCDs continue to operate. In these instances,
no increased uncontrolled emissions would occur. An example would be
the
continuous emissions monitor (CEM) failing its automatic calibration.
- The less common type is a less
controlled
discontinuation of HWF utilization, such as the result of a facility
power
failure. This would immediately result in an AWFCO of the HWF to the
kiln.
In this instance, the massive residual heat in the tons of processed
product
(the clinker and raw feed within the system) and the natural draft that
would continue to draw the flue gases through the APCDs would combust
the
small amount of organics within the combustion zone. Even without
electrical
power, the greatly reduced gas velocity and the decaying corona charge
in the ESP would be sufficient to continue to attenuate the emissions
of
particulates.
Cement
kiln systems inherently have a massive
store of energy and long gas retention times, unlike purpose built
hazardous
waste incinerators. Consequently, cement kilns have less potential,
tendency
or capability to emit hazardous waste constituents due to process upset
conditions which might result from shut-downs and/or equipment
malfunctions.
The concern
that the cement
process cannot
be reliably maintained within the selected operating parameters, and
that
exceedance of these parameters results in increased emissions, is
easily
addressed. Trial burns establish such operating limits as: maximum gas
flow rates, maximum raw feed rates, minimum APCD power, maximum APCD
inlet
temperature, maximum HWF feed rates, maximum chlorine feed rates,
maximum
trace metals feed rates, and maximum THC and CO emissions
simultaneously
during the testing. This testing, however, must demonstrate that the
emissions
are within that allowed by the regulation. Consequently, a conservative
(protective of the environment) operating envelope is established and
maintained
since an AWFCO would be initiated by an exceedance of any one
of
these operating limits even though these limits have already been
demonstrated
to be safe by the trial burn testing. With this understanding, an
examination
of the operational data, as recommended in Section 2.2.5, can only
result
in a conclusion that there would be no increased emissions due to
process
upsets in cement kilns operated under the BIF regulations.
Facility
operators have an
incentive to
operate well within this operating envelope to preclude AWFCOs and the
subsequent loss of revenue these interruptions entail. This incentive
provides
an added margin of safety. An examination of the operational data used
to derive an "upset" factor could also be used to derive a "decreased"
emissions factor resulting from the operator's avoidance of the
operating
limits that result in AWFCOs.
In
conclusion, cement kilns
operating within
the BIF regulations would not be expected to experience increased
emissions.
The operational limits established by the trial burn and enforced by
the
AWFCOs preclude increased emissions due to start-ups, shut-downs,
malfunctions
and process upsets. Indeed, the routine avoidance of these limits by
the
operators probably results in decreased emissions when compared to the
trial burn emission rates.
Reduction of Total Annual
Emissions
Due to Cement Kiln Down Time
Cement
facility operators must
perform
routine maintenance on the kiln and ancillary equipment. Much of this
can
be done without a significant amount of down time. However, one
maintenance
routine which cannot be avoided and will result in significant down
time
is the inspection and replacement of the fire brick lining of the kiln.
Generally, this requires three to five weeks each year from the time
the
fuel to the kiln is shut off until the use of HWF is restarted. During
this period, no emissions attributable to the use of HWF can occur.
This
down time period should be considered when estimating the total annual
emissions used to assess risk due to these emissions.Additionally,
there
are periods when HWF is not consumed. This may be due to the
unavailability
of suitable wastes or may be associated with the repair of required
equipment.
During these periods no emissions attributable to the use of HWF can
occur.
While more difficult to estimate, this down time should also be
considered
when estimating the total annual emissions used to assess risk.